1 2 3 4 5 6	Humberto M. Guizar (SBN 125769) Kent M. Henderson (SBN 139530) Angel Carrazco, Jr. (SBN 230845) GUIZAR, HENDERSON & CARRAZCO 18301 Irvine Boulevard Tustin, CA 92780 Telephone: (714) 541-8600 Facsimile: (714) 541-8601 Attorneys for Plaintiffs	D, L,L.P. DISTRICT COURT
	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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9	N.L.A., a minor by and through her guardian, MARICRUZ HERRERA,	Case No.
10	individually and as heir at law and successor in interest to NOEL	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
11	AGUILAR, deceased; and ELVIA AGUILAR, individually,	Unreasonable Search and Seizure—
12	Plaintiffs,	Detention and Arrest (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
13	VS.	2. Unreasonable Search and Seizure—
14	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES;	Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 3. Unreasonable Search and Seizure—
15	ALBERT MURAD, an individual; JOSE RUIZ, an individual, and DOES 3-10,	Denial of Medical Care (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
16	inclusive,	4. Substantive Due Process—(42 U.S.C. § 1983)
17	Defendants.	5. Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Custom, Practice,
18		or Policy—(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 6. False Arrest/ False Imprisonment
19		7. Battery (Wrongful Death)8. Negligence (Wrongful Death)
		o. Hogingonoo (Wrongrai Boaar)
20		DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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23	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES	
24	N.L.A, a minor, by and through their guardian, MARICRUZ HERRERA,	
25	individually and as successor in interest to NOEL AGUILAR, deceased, and ELVIA	
26	AGUILAR, individually, for their Complaint against Defendants COUNTY OF	
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

LOS ANGELES, ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ, and DOES 3-10, inclusive, allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

- 1. This civil rights and state tort action seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants for violating various rights under the United States Constitution and state law in connection with the fatal police shooting of NOEL AGUILAR, the father of N.L.A., and the son of ELVIA AGUILAR ("DECEDENT"), on May 26, 2014.
- 2. Defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ, and DOES 3-10 ("DEPUTIES") proximately caused DECEDENT's and Plaintiffs' injuries by firing the shots that killed DECEDENT, by integrally participating or failing to intervene in the shooting, and by engaging in other acts and/ or omissions around the time of the shooting that resulted in his death.
- 3. Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ("COUNTY"), ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOES 3-10 also proximately caused DECEDENT's and Plaintiffs' injuries and are liable under state law and under principles set forth in *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
- 4. The policies and customs behind shootings of civilians such as NOEL AGUILAR are fundamentally unconstitutional and constitute a menace of major proportions to the public. Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiffs herein seek by means of this civil rights action to hold accountable those responsible for the killing of NOEL AGUILAR and to challenge the COUNTY's unconstitutional policies and practices, this civil rights action is firmly in the public interest.

PARTIES

- 5. At all relevant times, decedent NOEL AGUILAR was an individual residing in the County of Los Angeles, California.
- 6. Plaintiff N.L.A. is a minor individual residing in the County of Los Angeles, California and is the natural born child of DECEDENT. N.L.A. sues by

- 7. Plaintiff ELVIA AGUILAR is an individual residing in the County of Los Angeles, California and is the mother of DECEDENT. ELVIA AGUILAR sues both in her individual capacity as the mother of DECEDENT and in a representative capacity as a successor-in-interest to DECEDENT pursuant to California Civil Code § 377.32. ELVIA AGUILAR seeks both survival and wrongful death damages under federal and state law.
- 8. Defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ, and DOES 3-8 (DEPUTIES) are sheriff's deputies for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LASD"). Said DEPUTIES were acting under color of law within the course and scope of their duties as sheriff's deputies for the LASD. Said DEPUTIES were acting with the complete authority and ratification of their principal, Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
- 9. Defendants DOES 9-10 are supervisorial officers for the LASD who were acting under color of law within the course and scope of their duties as sheriff's deputies for the LASD. DOES 9-10 were acting with the complete authority and ratification of their principal, Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
- 10. Defendants DOES 9-10 are managerial, supervisorial, and policymaking employees of the LASD, who were acting under color of law within the course and scope of their duties as managerial, supervisorial, and policymaking employees for the LASD. DOES 9-10 were acting with the complete authority and ratification of their principal, Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
- 11. On information and belief, defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOES 3-10 were residents of the County of Los Angeles.

- 13. In doing the acts and failing and omitting to act as hereinafter described, Defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES 3-8 were acting on the implied and actual permission and consent of supervisory Defendants DOES 9-10.
- 14. In doing the acts and failing and omitting to act as hereinafter described, Defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOES 3-10 were acting on the implied and actual permission and consent of the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
- 15. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, association or otherwise of Defendants DOES 3-10, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who otherwise sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this complaint to show the true names and capacity of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. Each of the fictitiously-named Defendants is responsible in some manner for the conduct or liabilities alleged herein.

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- 16. At all times mentioned herein, each and every Defendant was the agent of each and every other Defendant and had the legal duty to oversee and supervise the hiring, conduct, and employment of each and every Defendant.
- 17. All of the acts complained of herein by Plaintiffs against Defendants were done and performed by said Defendants by and through their authorized agents, servants, and/or employees, all of whom at all relevant times herein were acting within the course, purpose, and scope of said agency, service, and/or employment capacity. Moreover, Defendants and its agents ratified all of the acts complained of herein.
- 18. All Defendants who are natural persons, including defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOES 3-10, are sued individually and/or in his/her official capacity as officers, sergeants, captains, commanders, supervisors, and/or civilian employees, agents, policy makers, and representatives for the LASD.
- 19. NOEL AGUILAR died as a direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES. Defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES are directly liable for Plaintiffs' injuries under federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- 20. Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10 are liable for Plaintiffs' injuries under California law and under the doctrine of *respondeat superior*. Liability under California law for public entities and public employees is based upon California Government Code §§ 815.2, 820, and 820.8.
- 21. The Plaintiffs filed comprehensive and timely claims for damages with the County of Los Angeles on November 25, 2014, pursuant to applicable sections of the California Government Code.
- 22. On December 8, 2014, the County of Los Angeles denied said claims by a letter rejecting said claims.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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- This civil action is brought for the redress of alleged deprivations of 23. constitutional rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.
- Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all 24. incidents, events, and occurrences giving rise to this action occurred in the County of Los Angeles, California.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

- Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1. 25. through 24. of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- On May 26, 2014, the deceased, NOEL AGUILAR, was riding his 26. bicycle on the sidewalk of Long Beach Boulevard, in Long Beach, California. Defendants MURAD and RUIZ attempted to conduct a traffic stop. Noel Aguilar left his bicycle and ran northbound through an alley east of the 6900 Block of Long Beach Boulevard in Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California.
- The alley into which Noel Aguilar ran was a dead end alley with no 27. exit. When he stopped running, defendants MURAD and RUIZ caught up with Noel Aguilar and took him to the ground, face down. They then handcuffed his left wrist.
- While Noel Aguilar was handcuffed, face down, and being held down 28. by the two deputies, with other deputies standing nearby, defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ fired their service firearms multiple times, striking NOEL AGUILAR on the back side of his body multiple times, resulting in his death. One of the defendants, JOSE RUIZ, during this shooting spree, also shot the other defendant deputy, ALBERT MURAD.

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- At the time that he was shot and killed on May 26, 2014, NOEL 29. AGUILAR had committed no crimes and defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ lacked probable cause to make an arrest of his person.
- At the time that he was shot and killed on May 26, 2014, NOEL 30. AGUILAR presented no immediate danger to any of the deputies on the scene.
- 31. From the time that the defendants, ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ and DOES 3-8 first saw NOEL AGUILAR on May 26, 2014, until they shot and killed NOEL AGUILAR, minutes later, at no time during that relevant time period did NOEL AGUILAR have a weapon or firearm in his hands, or any object that appeared similar to a weapon or firearm.
- NOEL AGUILAR died on May 26, 2014, as a direct and immediate 32. result of being shot by defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ, sustaining gunshot wounds to the back of his neck, to the upper back, on the back of mid chest, to his right thigh, to his left arm, to his left shoulder, as well as sustaining lacerations, contusions and lacerations throughout his body.
- At no time, prior to being shot and killed by defendants ALBERT 33. MURAD and JOSE RUIZ, did NOEL AGUILAR display a weapon or other instrument, or take any physical action that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that his or her life was in danger or in threat of eminent harm.
- A weapon may have been found on NOEL AGUILAR after his death, 34. but said weapon was never displayed by NOEL AGUILAR, and the defendant deputies did not see a weapon prior to shooting and killing NOEL AGUILAR.
- After the shooting, the officers delayed requesting medical assistance 35. for NOEL AGUILAR.
- At the time of the shooting of May 26, 2014, NOEL AGUILAR was unarmed and did not have anything in his hands, other than a handcuff placed on his left wrist by the defendant deputies. Noel Aguilar was a person much smaller than either of the officers and presented no threat of bodily harm or death to the

- 37. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that NOEL AGUILAR died after experiencing great pain and anguish, after he was thrown down on the ground by defendant deputies, physically abused, then shot and killed by defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ.
- 38. On May 26, 2014, at the time of being shot, or immediately prior, NOEL AGUILAR was not engaged in the commission of a crime and, under the United States Constitution and the cases interpreting it, had rights including a liberty interest to be free in one's person from unlawful search and seizure of one's person and a right to not have excessive force used against him.
- 39. When defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ engaged in the pursuit of NOEL AGUILAR on May 26, 2014, they did not possess information that NOEL AGUILAR was engaged in the commission of a crime, and they had no reasonable suspicion of wrong doing, and there was no probable cause of the commission of a crime. Defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ, while acting under color of law, used excessive force in shooting and killing NOEL AGUILAR.
- 40. Defendants ALBERT MUAD and JOSE RUIZ and DOES 3-10, while acting within the course and scope of their employment with DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, detained and arrested NOEL AGUILAR, which was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as he had committed no crimes and there was no legal reason for him to be detained.
- 41. On May 26, 2014, in the 6900 block of Long Beach Boulevard, in the City of Long Beach, California, defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ,

- 42. At the time that the two officers, ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ, and the other deputies present, engaged in the pursuit of NOEL AGUILAR, he was engaged in the lawful activity of riding his bicycle. Even though he ran from the officers when they attempted a traffic stop, this did not justify the use of excessive force in shooting and killing him within a couple of minutes from the time of the initial encounter. Without warning of any sorts, and without legal justification, Defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ,, without reason, cause or justification, fired upon and killed NOEL AGUILAR. When NOEL AGUILAR was shot and killed, he presented no threat to the defendant officers or others, and there was no legal cause or excusive to seize the person or Noel Aguilar.
- 43. NOEL AGUILAR did as a direct result of being shot multiple times by defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ.
- 44. Defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ, and each of them, discharged his firearm recklessly, intentionally, tortuously and/or, in the alternative, negligently, with the intent to kill and/or commit serious bodily injury upon Noel Aguilar and to violate his civil rights.
- 45. DECEDENT Noel Aguilar sustained injuries, including but not limited to pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and death when he was shot by Defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ who were acting under color of law and as employees of the LASD. Defendants DOES 3-10, inclusive, integrally participated in or failed to intervene in the shooting.

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- 46. The use of deadly force against DECEDENT was excessive and objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, especially because at all relevant times DECEDENT was unarmed and posed no threat to defendants MURAD, RUIZ, or any DOE DEPUTY or any other individual.
- 47. Upon information and belief, after being shot, DECEDENT was immobile, bleeding profusely, and in obvious and critical need of emergency medical care and treatment. Defendants did not timely summon medical care or permit medical personnel to treat DECEDENT. The delay of medical care to DECEDENT caused DECEDENT extreme physical and emotional pain and suffering, and was a contributing cause of DECEDENT's death.
- 48. Plaintiffs N.L.A. and Elvia Aguilar were dependent on DECEDENT, including financially dependent.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unreasonable Search and Seizure—Detention and Arrest (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

(Against Defendants MURAD, RUIZ, and DOE DEPUTIES)

- 49. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 48 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 50. When Defendant ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES shot DECEDENT and placed him in handcuffs, they violated DECEDENT's right to be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed to the DECEDENT under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied to state actors by the Fourteenth Amendment.
- 51. As a result of their misconduct, Defendants MURAD, RUIZ, and DOE DEPUTIES are liable for DECEDENT's injuries, either because they were integral participants in the wrongful detention and arrest, or because they failed to intervene to prevent these violations.

- 52. Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES detained DECEDENT without reasonable suspicion and arrested him without probable cause.
- 53. The conduct of Defendant MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of DECEDENT and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages as to Defendants DOE DEPUTIES.
- 54. Plaintiffs N.L.A. and ELVIA AGUILAR bring this claim in each case as successor-in-interest to the DECEDENT, and in each case seek both survival and wrongful death damages for the violation of DECEDENT's rights.
 - 55. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees under this claim.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unreasonable Search and Seizure—Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

(Against Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES)

- 56. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 57. Defendants MURAD and RUIZ' unjustified shooting deprived DECEDENT of his right to be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed to DECEDENT under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied to state actors by the Fourteenth Amendment.
- 58. As a result, DECEDENT suffered extreme pain and suffering and eventually suffered a loss of life and of earning capacity. Plaintiffs have also been deprived of the life-long love, companionship, comfort, support, society, care, and sustenance of DECEDENT, and will continue to be so deprived for the remainder of their natural lives. Plaintiffs claim funeral and burial expenses and a loss of financial support.

- 59. The shooting was excessive and unreasonable, especially because DECEDENT had not threatened to cause physical injury to defendants MURAD, RUIZ or any DOE DEPUTIES or any other person.
- 60. Defendants MURAD and RUIZ' shooting and use of force against the person of NOEL AGUILAR violated their training.
- 61. The conduct of Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of DECEDENT and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages as to individual Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES.
- 62. Plaintiffs N.L.A., and ELVIA AGUILAR bring this claim in each case as a successor-in-interest to DECEDENT, and in each case seek both survival and wrongful death damages for the violation of DECEDENT's rights.
 - 63. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees under this claim.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unreasonable Search and Seizure—Denial of Medical Care (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(Against Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES)

- 64. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 63 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 65. The denial of medical care by Defendants MURAZ, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES deprived DECEDENT of his right to be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed to DECEDENT under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied to state actors by the Fourteenth Amendment.
- 66. As a result, DECEDENT suffered extreme pain and suffering and eventually suffered a loss of life and earning capacity. Plaintiffs have also been deprived of the life-long love, companionship, comfort, support, society, care, and

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sustenance of DECEDENT, and will continue to be so deprived for the remainder of their natural lives. Plaintiffs are also claiming funeral and burial expenses and a loss of financial support.

- 67. Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES knew that failure to provide timely medical treatment to DECEDENT could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, but disregarded that serious medical need, causing DECEDENT great bodily harm and death.
- 68. The conduct of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of DECEDENT and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages as to Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES.
- 69. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs N.I.A. and ELVIA AGUILAR bring this claim in each case as a successor-in-interest to DECEDENT, and in each case seek both survival and wrongful death damages for the violation of DECEDENT's rights.
 - 70. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees under this claim.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Substantive Due Process (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

(Against Defendants DOE DEPUTIES)

- 71. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 70 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 72. N.L.A. had a cognizable interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from state actions that deprive her of life, liberty, or property in such a manner as to shock the conscience, including but not limited to unwarranted state interference in Plaintiff's familial relationship with her father, DECEDENT.

- 73. ELVIA AGUILAR had a cognizable interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from state actions that deprive her of life, liberty, or property in such a manner as to shock the conscience, including but not limited to unwarranted state interference in Plaintiff's familial relationship with her son, DECEDENT.
- 74. DECEDENT had a cognizable interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from state actions that deprive him of his right to life, liberty, or property in such a manner as to shock the conscience.
- 75. The aforementioned actions of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES, along with other undiscovered conduct, shock the conscience, in that they acted with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of DECEDENT and Plaintiffs, and with purpose to harm unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement objective.
- 76. Defendants, MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES thus violated the substantive due process rights of Plaintiffs to be free from unwarranted interference with their familial relationship with DECEDENT.
- 77. As a direct and proximate cause of the acts of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES, DECEDENT experienced severe pain and suffering and lost his life and earning capacity. Plaintiffs suffered extreme and severe mental anguish and pain and have been injured in mind and body. Plaintiffs have also been deprived of the life-long love, companionship, comfort, support, society, care, and sustenance of DECEDENT, and will continue to be so deprived for the remainder of their natural lives. Plaintiffs are also claiming funeral and burial expenses and a loss of financial support.
- 78. The conduct of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety

of DECEDENT and Plaintiffs and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages as to Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES.

- 79. Plaintiffs N.L.A. and ELVIA AGUILAR bring this claim in each case individually and as a successor-in-interest to DECEDENT, and in each case seek both survival and wrongful death damages for the violation of DECEDENT's rights.
 - 80. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees under this claim.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Custom or Policy (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

(Against Defendants COUNTY and DOES 9-10)

- 81. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 80 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 82. At the time of the shooting of NOEL AGUILAR by defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ, defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES had in place, and had ratified, policies, procedures, customs and practices of the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Sheriff's Department which permitted and encouraged their Sheriff deputies and officials to unjustifiably, unreasonably violate the constitutional rights to the public that reside in the low income communities of the County of Los Angeles and in the South Central part of the County of Los Angeles.
- 83. Specifically, the defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and its Sheriff's Department, "LASD" has a history of criminal and violent gangs or "cliques" forming among sheriff's deputies in the County jails and at sub-stations throughout the County of Los Angeles. Those criminal and violent gangs that have been exposed thus far include the "Little Devils," the "Vikings," the "Regulators," the "3000 Boys," the "2000 Boys," the "Jump Out Boys," and others. These criminal and violent gangs self-identify through logos and tattoos. These criminal

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- 84. Problems associated with these deputy gangs have been known to the defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES since at least 1992. The 1992 Kolts Commission was created by the County after LASD shootings of unarmed citizens provoked popular protests and demonstrations. The Board of Supervisors appointed James G. Kolts, a highly respected retired superior court judge and former prosecutor to investigate the allegations of pervasive incidence of excessive force among LASD deputies. The subsequent report ("the Kolts Report") described problems associated with the "Vikings" gang at the Lynwood Station that had resulted in civil liability and an injunction. The Kolts Report described the "Vikings" gang as comprised of "an inner group of deputies with peculiar and unique hard attitudes" that "manifested themselves in the form of excessive force and disciplinary problems between deputies and their supervisors." The Kolts Report recommended that the LASD "identify, root out, and punish severely any lingering gang-like behavior by its deputies," and that "unit commanders aggressively break up deputy groups which manifest any of the conduct which signifies gang-related activity." These sheriff gangs have expanded into the south central Los Angeles area, including the specific location of the shooting in this case.
- 85. Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES knew or should have known about the findings of the Kolts Report, including the above recommendations. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that notwithstanding these recommendations, the defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES has ignored them and instead have been deliberately indifferent to the continued growth of deputy

gangs in LASD, including at Century Station, Lynwood Station, Lancaster, and in particular the LASD "Gang Suppression Units", which is the unit that defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOES 4-10 belonged to at the time that NOEL AGUILAR was shot, as alleged herein.

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- 86. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that on or before the date that NOEL AGUILAR was shot, the "Vikings" gang had merged with, had become known as, or had morphed into the Regulators" and "Jump Out Boys" gangs that worked throughout the County under the Gang Suppression Unit, (also referred to the Gang Enforcement Team, "GET"). Deputies belonging to these criminal and violent sheriff gangs were and are encouraged to use excessive force, including deadly force, against citizens. The use of excessive force, including discharge of firearms and use of deadly force, was celebrated by the members of these deputy gangs. With respect to the "Regulators" "Vikings" and "Jump Out Boys" gangs, the use of excessive or unreasonable force by a deputy associated with the gang increases a member's status within the gang. The status of a gang member is doubly increased if the force involved is lethal, as well as if the gang member avoids civil or criminal liability for his or her unlawful conduct. This gang-clique deputy culture is tolerated and condoned by the station's leadership, including top leadership in the LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. In this case, Defendants MURAD and RUIZ and DOES 4-10 were associated with, were members of, were associates of, sympathized with, were influenced by, or adopted the principles of the "Regulators" and "Jump Out Boys" gangs.
- 87. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that prior to the shooting of decedent NOEL AGUILAR, in a speech delivered by former Undersheriff Paul Tanaka to the patrol deputies at Century Station and deputies of the Gang Suppression Unit, COUNTY deputies were encouraged to "function right to the edge of the line" and be very aggressive in using force against citizens. Plaintiff believes this amounted to direct encouragement of these aforementioned

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deputy gangs, for whom the use of unconstitutional and excessive force is status symbol. This speech facilitated the use of unreasonable and excessive force against NOEL AGUILAR in this case.

- Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that on or 88. before the shooting of NOEL AGUILAR, defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES also encouraged the patrol deputies at Century Station, and deputies of the Gang Suppression Units (some of whom were or are members of gangs) to "operate in the grey area." Plaintiff contends that this was understood as further encouragement and support for the deputy gangs, and made more likely the use of unreasonable and excessive force against NOEL AGUILAR in this case.
- Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that prior to the shooting of NOEL AGUILAR, the Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES was aware of problems of insubordination, excessive use of force, and an internal "code of silence" among LASD deputies. The "code of silence," as it is colloquially known, is the understanding among deputies that misconduct, corruption, crimes, and the excessive use of force will not be reported through the chain of command. The "code of silence" means that peace officers are expected to generate false reports and perjure themselves to cover up the use of excessive force and other misconduct by other officers. The "code of silence" encourages criminal and violent gangs such as the "Vikings" and "Regulators" to commit insubordinate acts, generate false reports, and use excessive or unreasonable force in an environment which condoned, ratified and enabled deputy misconduct and use of excessive force.
- On and before May 26, 2014, defendant COUNTY OF LOS 90. ANGELES was aware or should have been aware that they had a problem on their hands. Some of the incidents leading up to this period include the following:
 - A Ninth Circuit decision holding that Defendant Former Sherriff Lee Baca could be held personally liable for unconstitutional practices in Defendant COUNTY's jails;

- (b) A series of civil rights settlements and verdicts adverse to Defendant COUNTY;
- (c) A series of public revelations of corruption, abuse and criminal conduct by local and national news outlets;
- (d) Investigations by Department of Justice, Department of Civil Rights and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
 - (e) A series of public meetings at the County Board of Supervisors, at which a motion was passed to form a Los Angeles County Citizens' Commission on Jail Violence (hereinafter "ACCJV").
- 91. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that based on the defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES' tolerance of rampant deputy misconduct, as stated above, LASD deputies operate under a COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES custom and practice of falsifying police reports of officer-involved shootings, including the fabrication of claims that the victim was reaching for his waistband or was aiming a weapon at them at the time of the shooting.
- 92. Said policies, procedures, customs and practices also called for the defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and its Sheriff's Department not to discipline, prosecute, or objectively and/or independently investigate or in any way deal with or respond to known incidents, complaints, of wrongful shootings by deputy sheriffs of the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, or the related claims and lawsuits made as a result of such shootings.
- 93. Said policies, procedures, customs and practices called for and lead to the refusal of defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES to investigate complaints of previous incidents of wrongful shootings and, instead, officially claim that such incidents were justified and proper.
- 94. Said policies, procedures, customs and practices called for the refusal of defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES to conduct executive meetings within five days of such shootings to evaluate the shooting, prepare a plan to conceal any

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misconduct committed during such incidents, and to plan and conduct a campaign to conceal such misconduct.

- Said policies, procedures, customs and practices called for COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, by means of inaction and coverup, to encourage its sheriff deputies to believe that improper shooting of unarmed suspects, including members of minority groups, was permissible. The concealment and cover up included writing false police reports and testifying falsely as to how the excessive force incident occurred.
- 96. Said policies, procedures, customs and practices of defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES evidenced a deliberate indifference to the violations of the constitutional rights of NOEL AGUILAR. This indifference was manifested by the failure to change, correct, revoke, or rescind said policies, procedures, customs and practices in light of prior knowledge by defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES of indistinguishably similar incidents of unjustified and unreasonable Police shootings.
- Said policies, procedures, customs and practices of defendant 97. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES evidenced a deliberate indifference to the violations of the constitutional rights of NOEL AGUILAR. This indifference was manifested by the failure to change, correct, revoke, or rescind said policies, procedures, customs and practices, and tactic and weapons training in light of prior knowledge by defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES of indistinguishably similar incidents.
- Deliberate indifference to the civil rights of minority groups and other 98. victims of excessive force and Police officer-involved shootings was also evidenced by defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ignoring of the history and pattern of prior civil lawsuits alleging civil rights violations and the related payment of judgments to such individuals.
- Deliberate indifference is also evidenced by maintenance of an 99. inadequate system of firearms discharges by the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT which failed to identify instances of improper use of firearms, as well as by the failure of by said defendant to adequately train and more closely supervise or retrain deputies who in fact improperly used such weapons.

- 100. Other systemic deficiencies of COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES which indicated, and continue to indicate, a deliberate indifference to the violations of the civil rights by Sheriff's deputies of the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES include:
 - (a) preparation of investigative reports designed to vindicate the use of firearms, regardless of whether such use was justified;
 - (b) preparation of investigative reports which uncritically rely solely on the word of Sheriff deputies involved in the shooting incidents and which systematically fail to credit testimony by non-deputy witnesses;
 - (c) preparation of investigative reports which omit factual information and physical evidence which contradicts the accounts of the deputies involved;
 - (d) issuance of public statements exonerating deputies involved in such incidents prior to the completion of investigations of the shootings;
 - (e). failure to objectively and independently review investigative reports by responsible supervisors for accuracy or completeness and acceptance of conclusions which are unwarranted by the evidence of the shooting or which contradict such evidence; and,
 - (f) failure to maintain centralized department-wide system for the tracking and monitoring of the use of excessive force, abuse of authority, and race-based misconduct by individual Sheriff deputies so as to identify those deputies who engage in a pattern of excessive force, abuse of authority, and misconduct.
- 101. The foregoing acts, omissions, and systemic deficiencies are policies and customs of defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES caused defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOES 3-10 to be unaware of the rules and laws governing permissible use of firearms and to believe that firearms discharges are entirely

within the discretion of the deputy and that improper discharges would not be objectively, thoroughly and properly investigated, all with the foreseeable result that defendants ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ would use deadly force in situations where such force is neither necessary, reasonable nor legal, thereby violating the civil rights of the citizens of this state.

- 102. As a result of the aforementioned acts, omissions, systematic deficiencies, policies, procedures, customs and practices of defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant deputy sheriffs ALBERT MURAD and JOSE RUIZ wrongfully shot and killed NOEL AGUILAR, thereby causing the damages claimed herein.
- 103. On information and belief, Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES' unjustified shooting of DECEDENT was found to be within LASD policy.
- 104. On information and belief, Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES' unjustified shooting of DECEDENT was ratified by LASD supervisorial officers.
- 105. On information and belief, Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES were not disciplined for the unjustified shooting DECEDENT.
- 106. On and for some time prior to May 26, 2014 (and continuing to the present date), Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10, acting with gross negligence and with reckless and deliberate indifference to the rights and liberties of the public in general, and of Plaintiffs and DECEDENT, and of persons in their class, situation and comparable position in particular, knowingly maintained, enforced and applied an official recognized custom, policy, and practice of:
 - (a) Employing and retaining as police officers and other personnel, including defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ DOE DEPUTIES 3-8, whom Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10 at all times material herein knew or

reasonably should have known had dangerous propensities for abusing their authority and for mistreating citizens by failing to follow written LASD policies, including the use of excessive force;

- (b) Of inadequately supervising, training, controlling, assigning, and disciplining COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES sheriff's deputies and other personnel, including defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ, DOE DEPUTIES 3-8, whom Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10 knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known had the aforementioned propensities and character traits, including the propensity for violence and the use of excessive force;
- (c) By maintaining grossly inadequate procedures for reporting, supervising, investigating, reviewing, disciplining and controlling the intentional misconduct by Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES, who are sheriff's deputies and/or agents of COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES;
- (d) By failing to discipline COUNTY sheriff's deputies' and/or agents' conduct, including but not limited to, unlawful detention and excessive force;
- (e) By ratifying the intentional misconduct of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES and other sheriff's deputies and/or agents, who are sheriff's deputies and/or agents of COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES;
- (f) By having and maintaining an unconstitutional policy, custom, and practice of detaining and arresting individuals without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and using excessive force, including deadly force, which also is demonstrated by

inadequate training regarding these subjects. The policies, customs, and practices of Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10 were maintained with a deliberate indifference to individuals' safety and rights; and

- (g) By failing to properly investigate claims of unlawful detention and excessive force by COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES sheriff's deputies.
- 107. By reason of the aforementioned policies and practices of Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10, DECEDENT was severely injured and subjected to pain and suffering and lost his life.
- 108. Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10, together with various other officials, whether named or unnamed, had either actual or constructive knowledge of the deficient policies, practices and customs alleged in the paragraphs above. Despite having knowledge as stated above, these defendants condoned, tolerated and through actions and inactions thereby ratified such policies. Said defendants also acted with deliberate indifference to the foreseeable effects and consequences of these policies with respect to the constitutional rights of DECEDENT, Plaintiffs, and other individuals similarly situated.
- 109. By perpetrating, sanctioning, tolerating and ratifying the outrageous conduct and other wrongful acts, Defendants DOES 9-10 acted with intentional, reckless, and callous disregard for the life of DECEDENT and for DECEDENT's and Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Furthermore, the policies, practices, and customs implemented, maintained, and still tolerated by Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 9-10 were affirmatively linked to and were a significantly influential force behind the injuries of DECEDENT and Plaintiffs.
- 110. The actions of each of Defendants DOES 9-10 were willful, wanton, oppressive, malicious, fraudulent, and extremely offensive and unconscionable to

a substantial factor in causing the harm to DECEDENT.

- 120. Defendant COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its employees within the scope of the employment if the employee's act would subject him or her to liability.
- 121. The conduct of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES was malicious, wanton, oppressive, and accomplished with a conscious disregard for the rights of DECEDENT, entitling Plaintiffs to an award of exemplary and punitive damages.
- 122. Plaintiffs N.L.A. and ELVIA AGUILAR bring this claim in each case as a successor-in-interest to DECEDENT, and in each case seek both survival and wrongful death damages for the violation of DECEDENT's rights.
 - 123. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees under this claim.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Battery (Cal. Govt. Code § 820 and California Common Law)

(Wrongful Death)

(Against All Defendants)

- 124. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 102 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 125. Defendants ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES, while working as sheriff's deputies for the LASD, and acting within the course and scope of their duties, intentionally shot DECEDENT multiple times. As a result of the actions of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES, DECEDENT suffered severe pain and suffering and ultimately died from his injuries and also lost his earning capacity. Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES had no legal justification for using force against DECEDENT, and said Defendants' use of

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force while carrying out their duties as sheriff's deputies was an unreasonable use of force.

- 126. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES as alleged above, Plaintiffs and DECEDENT suffered extreme and severe mental anguish and pain and have been injured in mind and body. Plaintiffs also have been deprived of the life-long love, companionship, comfort, support, society, care and sustenance of DECEDENT, and will continue to be so deprived for the remainder of their natural lives. Plaintiffs also are claiming funeral and burial expenses and a loss of financial support.
- 127. Defendants DOES 9-10, inclusive, are directly liable and responsible for the acts of Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE 3-8 because DOES 9-10, inclusive, failed to adequately train, discipline, supervise, or in any other way control Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES in the exercise of their unlawful use of excessive and lethal force.
- 128. The COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOES 3-10 pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its employees within the scope of the employment if the employee's act would subject him or her to liability.
- 129. The conduct of defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOE 3-10 was malicious, wanton, oppressive, and accomplished with a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and DECEDENT, entitling Plaintiffs, in each case individually and as a successor-in-interest to DECEDENT, to an award of exemplary and punitive damages as to Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOES 3-10.
- 130. Plaintiffs N.L.A. and ELVIA AGUILAR bring this claim in each case as a successor-in-interest to DECEDENT, and in each case seek both survival and wrongful death damages for the violation of DECEDENT's rights.
 - 131. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees under this claim.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Negligence (Cal. Govt. Code § 820 and California Common Law) (Wrongful Death)

(Against All Defendants)

- 132. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 110 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 133. The actions and inactions of Defendants were negligent and reckless, including but not limited to:
 - (a) the failure to properly and adequately assess the need to detain, arrest, and use force or deadly force against DECEDENT;
 - (b) the negligent tactics and handling of the situation with DECEDENT, including pre-shooting negligence;
 - (c) the negligent detention, arrest, and use of force, including deadly force, against DECEDENT;
 - (d) the failure to provide prompt medical care to DECEDENT;
 - the failure to properly train and supervise employees, both
 professional and non-professional, including defendants
 MURAD, RUIZ and DOE DEPUTIES;
 - (f) the failure to ensure that adequate numbers of employees with appropriate education and training were available to meet the needs of and protect the rights of DECEDENT;
- above, and other undiscovered negligent conduct, DECEDENT was caused to suffer severe pain and suffering and ultimately died and lost earning capacity. Also as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct as alleged above, Plaintiffs suffered extreme and severe mental anguish and pain and have been injured in mind and body. Plaintiffs also have been deprived of the life-long love, companionship,

comfort, support, society, care and sustenance of DECEDENT, and will continue to be so deprived for the remainder of their natural lives. Plaintiffs also are claiming funeral and burial expenses and a loss of financial support.

- 135. The COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOES 3-10 pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its employees within the scope of the employment if the employee's act would subject him or her to liability.
- 136. The conduct of Defendants MURAD, RUIZ, and DOES 3-10 was malicious, wanton, oppressive, and accomplished with a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and DECEDENT, entitling Plaintiffs, individually and as successors-in-interest to DECEDENT, to an award of exemplary and punitive damages as to individual Defendants MURAD, RUIZ and DOES 3-10.
- 137. Plaintiffs N.L.A. and ELVIA AGUILAR bring this claim in each case as successor-in-interest to the DECEDENT, and in each case seek both survival and wrongful death damages for the violation of DECEDENT's rights.
 - 138. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees under this claim.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request entry of judgment in their favor and against Defendants the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ALBERT MURAD, JOSE RUIZ, and Does 3-10, inclusive, as follows:

- A. For compensatory damages, including both survival damages and wrongful death damages under federal and state law, in the amount to be proven at trial;
- B. For funeral and burial expenses, and loss of financial support;

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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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